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Evol uti on and Organizational Information Systems:
An Assessment of Nol an's Stage Model*

John Leslie King

Kenneth L. Kraemer

Public Policy Research Organization
University of California, Irving
ABSTRACT
The stage model of Richard Nolan, as published between 1973

and 1979, is the best known model of evolution related to
organizational information systems. The model has been accepted as a sound description of this evolution, but has
never been subjected to careful conceptual assessment. This

paper eval uates the model in 1 ight of its logical structure
and its pl ace within the larger realm of evol ution expl ana-

tlons in the social sciences.

The model evolved over a period of years. The original 1973
version derived from the "S" shaped logistic curve of growth

in computing budgets. The three points of directional change
in the curve were taken as a surrogate of major changes in
the environment and management of computing within the or-

dividing the total curve into four sections

ganization,

Nol an called "stages:" initiation (beginning of use); conta-

gion

(rapid

expansion

of

use);

control

(constraining

response from top management to restrict growth); and in(refinement
of
controls
to
accomplish
organizational objectives in computing use). This basic detegration

scriptive hypothesis was elaborated in the 1974 version
(with Cyrus Gibson) which added two significant features:
definition of the primary driving agent in computing growth

as change in technol ogy; and the devel opment of the model as
an equilibrium model . The state of computing at any time was

the result of an equilibrium between the stimulating forces
of technical change and the constraining forces of manageri al control policies.
The model was elaborated in 1977 and 1979 to include two new

stages. Management policies were characterized as either
"slack" policies (lack of control s, encouragement of innovation)

or

"control "

policies

(constraints

on

growth,

encouragement of efficiency). The S curve was said to illustrate the organization's "learning curve" in dealing with

computing, in which management policy improves over time in
its effectiveness at achieving desired results. A basic
change was said to be underway in management attitude toward

*This paper is forthcoming in Communications of the ACM.
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computing, from concentration on control
sources to control
of organizational

of computing redata
resources,

stimulated in part by the emerging technol ogy of database

management systems. A new stage called data administration
was added to the model, which would eventually give way to a
sixth stage called maturity. In maturity managers woul d be

sufficiently knowledgeable to effect a productive balance or
equilibrium between sl ack (encouraging innovation) and con-

trol (encouraging efficiency).
Our

evaluation

of

the

model

reveal s

probl ems

with

its

assumptions. First, the empirical foundation of the model is
questionable. Computing budgets are not likely to be effective surrogates for the wide range of variables they are
said to represent, and, as subsequent empirical research has
shown, do not necessarily conform to the S curve. Moreover,
predictions made .using the model 's .assumptions have proven

inaccurate. Second, the focus on technological change as the
basic driving force in computing growth is probably too sim-

plistic. It does not adequately deal with the many
demand-related contextual factors of change that have been
shown emplrically to be important. Third, the model implicitly assumes that there is cl arity and congruity on
organizational goals for computing use among top managers,
but this expectation is seldom uphel d. A 1 ack of congruity

in goals weakens the assumption that acquisition of knowledge will automatically result in the development of
appropriate management controls. Fourth, we doubt that
knowledge of "appropriate" means for deal ing with computing

will be as easy to acquire as the model suggests. There are
many competi ng theories about how "best" to manage computing,

and differences in organizational

actors' abilities to

acquire knowledge and dispositions about how to use it.
There is no specification in the model regarding how knowledge of appropriate policies leading to maturity will

be

found and applied. Fifth, balancing control vs. slack policles implies that managers have some idea of the di recti on
computing use is headed. In fact, most policies are reactive, and the notion that balance can be deliberately
achieved is questionable. Finally, the assumption that
change actually proceeds in a continuous manner is not
upheld either by the history of computing development in organizations or by other studies of organizational or social
change.
Within the context of evol ution expl anati ons in the social
sciences, Nolan' s model is an exampl e of "evol utionist"

models, which assume same a priori direction of change and
an expected end state of change, but seldom precisely specify the mechanisms whereby change takes pl ace. Nol an' s model

posits a definite end state (integration in the early versions, maturity in the 1 ater versions), but does not provide
a

detail ed

account

of

how

change takes
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pl ace.

As such,

Nolan's model offers some useful insights, but suffers from
problems common to evolutionist models: it is difficult to
test empi rically, and does not offer a good account of why

specific changes occur the way they do. Most importantly,
the only empi rical

test avall abl e for such model s (waiting

to see whether predictions made using them prove to be correct) has not supported the Nolan model to date. The model
remains an insightful organizing framework for thinking
about computing change in organizations, but is not the empirically validated model of change some of its proponents
claim it to be.
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